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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEx DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT-Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wn. 2d 298,582
P.2d 487 (1978), prob.juris. noted, 99 S. Ct. 718 (1979).
Two of several statutes governing the composition and organiza-
tion of the major political parties in Washington, R.C.W. § 29.42-
0201 and R.C.W. § 29.42.030,2 require that certain pairs of party
representatives consist of one man and one woman. Following an in-
traparty dispute various interested persons filed suit,3 challenging, in-
ter alia,4 the constitutionality of R.C.W. §§ 29.42.020-.030 under
Washington's Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).5 The trial court
granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on this claim. In a five to
four decision the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the
constitutionality of both statutes under the ERA because they did not
discriminate on the basis of gender. Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wn. 2d
298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978).
1. Section 29.42.020 provides in relevant part: "The state committee of each major
political party shall consist of one committeeman and one committeewoman from each
county elected by the county committee at its organization meeting. It shall have a
chairman and vice chairman who must be of opposite sexes." WASH. REV. CODE § 29.-
42.020 (1976).
2. Section 29.42.030 provides in relevant part: "At its organizational meeting, the
county central committee shall elect a chairman and vice chairman who must be of op-
posite sexes; it shall also elect a state committeeman and a state committeewoman."
WASH. REV. CODE § 29.42.030 (1976).
3. In 1976 the Washington State Democratic Convention adopted a new charter for
the Democratic State Committee. Under the previous charter, the State Committee con-
sisted of two representatives from each of the 39 counties in Washington. Brief of Re-
spondents at 2, Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wn. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978). In an at-
tempt to reflect more closely the distribution of the population, the amended charter ad-
ded one delegate for each legislative district. CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
WASHINGTON art. IV, para. G(4). The State Committee elected prior to the
1976 Convention refused to recognize the new charter or to seat the delegates elected
pursuant to it. Brief of Respondents, supra at 2-3.
In an attempt to force the State Committee to operate under the new charter, the
plaintiffs challenged R.C.W. §§ 29.42.020-.030 because the new charter was inconsis-
tent with the statute. The plaintiffs included the party chairpersons from King, Pierce,
and Spokane counties, several legislative district organization representatives, several
members of the Commission which drafted the 1976 charter, and one State Committee
member.
4. The court also considered a challenge to R.C.W. § 29.42.020 based on the right to
freedom of association. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has noted probable
jurisdiction on this issue. Marchioro v. Chaney, 99 S. Ct. 718 (1979). This challenge,
however, is beyond the scope of this note.
5. The Washington Equal Rights Amendment provides: "Equality of rights and re-
sponsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." WASH.
CONST. art. 3 1, § 1.
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The importance of Marchioro is twofold. First, the standards of re-
view adopted by state courts under their respective equal rights provi-
sions may influence the standard of review under, and hence, the im-
pact of, the federal ERA. 6 Second, Marchioro's interpretation of'
Washington's ERA constitutes substantive state law, which will con-
tinue to be applied even if the federal ERA is ratified.7
I. BACKGROUND
Seventeen states have adopted equal rights provisions prohibiting
discrimination based on gender. 8 A variety of review standards has
been adopted under these provisions. In determining which standard
to apply, one of the most influential factors has been the language of
the particular provision. Most states have opted for some form of
equal protection analysis. 9
6. The proposed Amendment XXVII to the United States Constitution provides:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
Sec. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratifica-
tion.
Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
For a review of state ERA's in general, see Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Ex-
perience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086 (1977).
7. There has been a growing tendency in state courts to find broader protection for
individual rights in state constitutional provisions than those afforded under recent in-
terpretations of the Federal Constitution. See Brennan. State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976). See
also Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. LA. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975). This same analysis applies to the ERA. Even if a
less restrictive standard of review was adopted under the proposed federal ERA, a state
could continue to apply a stricter standard of review under its own equal rights provi-
sion.
8. Alaska, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 29; Connect-
icut, CONN. CoNrsT. art. 1, § 20; Hawaii, HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 4; Illinois, ILL. CONST.
art. 1, § 18; Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. 1, § 12; Maryland, MD. CONST. art. 46; Massa-
chusetts, MASS. CONST. art. 1; Montana, MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4; New Hampshire,
N.H. CONST. Part First, art. 1; New Mexico, N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18; Pennsylvania,
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28; Texas, TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3-a; Utah, UTAH CONST. art. 4, § 1;
Virginia, VA. CONST. art. 1, § I1; Washington, WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1; Wyoming,
WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
9. Nine states have adopted constitutional equal rights provisions similar to the pro-
posed federal ERA, which provides that equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex: Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
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A. Equal Protection Analysis
Although it may no longer be doing so, the United States Supreme
Court traditionally has used a two-tiered approach in reviewing legis-
lation challenged under the equal protection clause. 10
The first tier, or "rational basis" test, has been adopted by a few
state courts for reviewing equal rights challenges." Under this stan-
dard, the challenged statute is upheld if there is a rational relationship
between the classification and a legitimate legislative objective.' 2
Courts have not hesitated to infer such a relationship. 13 As a result,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington (citations in note 8 supra). B.
BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 19 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as A. FREEDMAN]. Eight states have adopted other constitutional pro-
visions prohibiting or limiting sex discrimination: Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisi-
ana, Montana, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming (citations in note 8 supra). A. FREEDMAN,
supra at 19. In the nine states with provisions similar to the federal ERA, courts have
generally applied the "suspect classification" standard of the equal protection clause.
See note 23 infra. In the other states, what little authority there is has tended toward ap-
plying the traditional or heightened rationality test. A. FREEDMAN, supra at 31; see note
11 infra.
10. Some commentators have suggested the Court is developing and applying a
three-tier equal protection analysis. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards
of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permis-
sive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1072 (1974); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court,
The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA.
L. REV. 945, 953 (1975). This three-tier approach, however, is only inferred from and
not expressly found in the Court's equal protection decisions. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate level of scrutiny applied).
11. For example, in State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975), a statute holding
only husbands criminally liable for nonsupport was found to be a reasonable legislative
classification, so that it did not violate the Louisiana equal rights provision. In Cox v.
Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975), the court held that although a mother does not have ab-
solute right to custody, there is wisdom in the traditional thinking that children should
be in the care of their mother, and the equal rights amendment does not require the law
to ignore obvious and essential biological differences. Finally, in Archer v. Mayes, 194
S.E.2d 707 (Va. 1973), the court held that a statute allowing any woman selected for
jury duty to be exempted for care of a child 16 years old or younger did not violate the
Virginia Constitution's equal rights provision because the state had a substantial inter-
est in the care of children and because the classification bore a rational relationship to
that objective.
12. E.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335" U.S. 464 (1948). In Goesaert the Court upheld a
statute making it illegal to license a woman bartender unless she was the wife or daugh-
ter of the owner of a licensed liquor establishment on the ground that it was not without
basis in reason. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-96
(1978).
13. In McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'n, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), the Court
upheld an Illinois absentee voting statute which made no provision for inmates awaiting
trial who are qualified voters but are unable to reach the polls because they are charged
711
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legislation reviewed under the rational basis standard is rarely struck
down. 14 For example, Louisiana, which applies the "rational basis"
test under its equal rights provision, has used the traditional societal
role of women as a rational basis for upholding differing treatment of
the sexes. 15
Under the prevailing federal analysis, a statute which utilizes a
"suspect classification" such as race, 16 alienage, t7 or national origin,1 8
or interferes with a "fundamental right" such as the right to vote, 19 is
properly tested under "strict scrutiny."20 Once the party challenging
with unbailable crimes or cannot post the bail: "Legislatures are presumed to have acted
constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their
grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set
aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them." Id. at 809 (emphasis sup-
plied). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 996.
14. Gunther describes the rational basis standard as "minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra note 10, at 8. See, e.g., McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (affirming a conviction for violation of Sunday closing laws
because the statutory classification could reasonably be related to the legislative goal of
providing a general day of rest). In McGowan, the Court declared: "[T] he Fourteenth
Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect
some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective." Id. at 425 (emphasis supplied).
15. In Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. App. 1975), the trial court's
preference for custody by the mother was held not unreasonable because the "simple
fact" was that the day-to-day care of minor children has "traditionally" been in the
hands of the mother. See also State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975), discussed in
note 11 supra.
16. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971). However, in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), the Court indicated
that alienage classifications involving "'matters ... within a State's constitutional pre-
rogatives,' " could be justified "by a showing of some rational relationship between the
interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification." Id. at 1070.
18. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
19. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Other funda-
mental rights include the right to interstate travel, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), and the right to a criminal appeal, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
20. Before Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court applied the tradi-
tional rationality test to gender-based classifications. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a statute which gave women an absolute exemption from jury
duty); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a statute which prohibited a
female from being licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the
male owner of a licensed liquor establishment). Beginning with Reed, the Court ap-
peared to modify the rational basis test for gender-based classifications. In that case the
Court struck down a provision of the Idaho Probate Code which created a preference for
men over women as administrators of estates. The Court held:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make
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the statute establishes that a suspect classification is used or a funda-
mental interest affected, the burden of upholding the statute shifts to
its proponent. The classification must be shown to advance a compel-
ling state interest. A substantial congruity between the classification
used and the purpose behind the statute must be demonstrated. 21 Few
statutes can withstand such rigorous examination and the decision to
apply strict scrutiny is generally dispositive of the case.22
Several states use strict scrutiny in evaluating classifications under
equal rights provisions.2 3 Illinois has developed a substantial body of
law applying this standard. 24 Relying on the recognition by the fram-
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive
values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not law-
fully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.
404 U.S. at 76-77.
This analysis was extended by the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). An administrative requirement that a female attempting to claim her spouse as
a dependent for purposes of obtaining military benefits must demonstrate her spouse's
actual dependency on her, in the absence of a similar requirement on male servicemen,
was struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. Four members of the Court
in Frontiero were of the opinion that sex was a suspect class. Id. at 682.
In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), however, a majority of the Court apparently
abandoned the strict scrutiny approach. The Court upheld a statute granting all widows
a $500 property tax exemption, stating that it was based on a reasonable distinction be-
tween men and women, namely, that the financial difficulties confronting a lone woman
are greater than those facing a lone man. Id. at 353-55. Recent cases suggest a return to
Reed's heightened rationality test. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Craig
Court observed, "To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197 (emphasis supplied).
21. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1000-1003.
22. Gunther describes it as" 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note
10, at 8. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding intern-
ment of Japanese on West Coast during World War II despite strict scrutiny); People v.
Boyer, 63 II. 2d 433, 349 N.E.2d 50 (1976) (upholding a statute which punished sexual
activity between father and daughter more severely than sexual activity between mother
and son despite strict scrutiny because of the compelling state interest in protecting fe-
male incest victims, who were exposed to greater potential harm than male victims).
23. E.g., Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1976) (holding
that any classification based on sex is a suspect classification and subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny); Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alas. 1975) (holding strict
scrutiny appropriate in deciding cases under Alaska's ERA); People v. Green, 183
Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973) (requiring that a legislative classification based solely on
sex receive the closest judicial scrutiny); Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v.
Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973) (including sex within the ambit of suspect clas-
sifications).
24. The Illinois Constitution provides: "The equal protection of the laws shall not
be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State .... ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18. Cases
interpreting this provision include People v. Boyer, 63 Ill. 2d 433, 349 N.E.2d 50
(1976), discussed in note 22 supra; People ex. rel. Irby v. Dubois, 41 111. App. 3d 609,
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ers of the Illinois Constitution of the two traditional levels of equal
protection review, and on the wording of the Illinois ERA, the court
in People v. Ellis25 found a legislative intent26 to treat gender as a sus-
pect classification. 27
It should be noted that prior to the adoption of the ERA, Washing-
ton also applied strict scrutiny in reviewing gender-based discrimina-
tion claims under Washington's equal protection clause.28
B. Absolute Standard of Review
Proponents of the federal ERA have long contended that the
amendment would make sex an impermissible factor in determining
legal rights.2 9 The Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the pro-
354 N.E.2d 562 (1976) (holding that both parents should have equal standing to obtain
custody of illegitimate child); Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill. App. 3d
479, 317 N.E.2d 681 (1974) (replacing presumption of child custody in favor of the
mother with sexually neutral criterion based on the best interests and welfare of the
child).
25. 57 IIl. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
26. The court looked to the constitutional convention debates (Illinois drafted a
new Constitution in 1970) and the wording of the provision itself. The court quoted a
member of the Illinois constitutional convention:
"But I might point out then that this equal protection clause... [ILL. CONST. art. 1.
§ 2, a provision similar to the federal equal protection clause] has never been held
to apply to women, in the same way, say, that it has been held to apply to blacks;
and until that time comes-and that may be another long case-by-case develop-
ment-I think the need for this amendment to make explicit that we do mean that
women cannot be denied this type of equality is necessary."
311 N.E.2d at 100.
Similarly, the Washington court in Marchioro, 90 Wn. 2d at 304-05, 582 P.2d at 491.
building on Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 871, 540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975). evidenced
a willingness to consider the history and purpose of the ERA in determining which stan-
dard of review to apply. See note 46 infra.
27. Under the challenged statutes, females were considered minors for purposes of
criminal prosecution until age 18, while males were considered minors until age 17.
The court could find no compelling state interest in treating 17-year-old males differ-
ently from 17-year-old females and struck down this portion of the statute. 311 N.E.2d
at 101.
28. In Hanson v. Hutt, 85 Wn. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1974), the court held sex a sus-
pect classification subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the privileges and immunities
clause of the Washington State Constitution. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 871, 540
P.2d 882, 889 (1975), quoted in Marchioro, 90 Wn. 2d at 304-05, 582 P.2d at 491,
subsequently rejected this approach under the ERA. See note 46 and accompanying text
infra.
29. See Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE LJ. 871, 889 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Emerson]. This article explains that "The fundamental legal prin-
ciple underlying the Equal Rights Amendment... is that the law must deal with particu-
lar attributes of individuals, not with a classification based on the broad and impermis-
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posed federal ERA points out, "The basic principle on which the
Amendment rests may be stated shortly: sex should not be a factor in
determining the legal rights of men or of women. The Amendment
thus recognizes the fundamental dignity and individuality of each hu-
man being. '3 0 Legislative history indicates, however, that Congress
contemplated certain exceptions to the absolute prohibition of gen-
der-based classifications. For example, a statute which classifies on
the basis of a physical characteristic unique to one sex would be per-
missible.31 Likewise, rights under the ERA should be placed within
the entire constitutional framework and balanced against other consti-
tutional rights, such as the right to privacy. 32 Finally, the ERA would
not affect the "traditional power of the State to regulate cohabitation
and sexual activity by unmarried persons.133
Only Pennsylvania has approached adopting an absolute stan-
dard. 34 In Conway v. Dana,3 5 the court abolished a presumption that
sible attribute of sex." Id. at 893. Although sex is an impermissible classification the
legislature could "continue to classify on the basis of real differences in the life situa-
tions and characteristics of individuals." Id. at 896. Also, the ERA must be balanced
against other constitutional rights. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR
MEN AND WOMEN, S. Doc. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1976).
30. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 29, at 2. The legislative history of
the federal ERA also indicates that although "[t] he law may operate by grouping indi-
viduals in terms of existing characteristics or functions, [it may not do so] through a
vast over-classification by sex." Id. at 12.
31. Emerson, supra note 29, at 896. The Senate Report points out: "[T he original
resolution does not require that women must be treated in all respects the same as men.
'Equality' does not mean 'sameness.' As a result, the original resolution would not pro-
hibit reasonable classifications based on characteristics that are unique-to one sex." SEN-
ATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 29, at 12.
32. Emerson, supra note 29, at 900-02. The Senate Report also contends that "the
principle of equality... does not prohibit the States from requiring a reasonable separa-
tion of persons of different sexes under some circumstances .... [The constitutional
right of privacy] would permit a separation of the sexes with respect to such places as
public toilets, as well as sleeping quarters of public institutions." SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 29, at 12. As regards the Washington ERA, the Official Voters
Pamphlet for the 1972 election explains: "Supreme Court decisions guarantee the right
to privacy in situations involving sleeping, disrobing, or performing bodily functions."
Secretary of State, Official Voters Pamphlet 52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Voters
Pamphlet]. The authoritativeness of the Voters Pamphlet is discussed in note 78 infra.
33. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 29, at 12.
34. Pennsylvania has a highly developed body of law under its equal rights provi-
sion. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974); Hopkins v.
Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324
(1974). These cases hold that sex is no longer a permissible factor in determining legal
rights. See generally Beck, Equal Rights Amendment: The Pennsylvania Experience, 81
DICK. L. REV. 395, 395-98 (1976), Comment, A Review of the Implementation of the
Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 683,714-20 (1976).
35. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
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the primary duty of support of minor children lay with the father. It
first declared that "[s] uch a presumption is clearly a vestige of the
past and incompatible with the present recognition of equality of the
sexes." 36 The presumption was replaced with a sexually neutral stan-
dard, requiring both parents to contribute to child support according
to their abilities. 37 In Henderson v. Henderson,38 a divorce action, the
Pennsylvania court invalidated a statute requiring payment of ali-
mony, counsel fees and expenses to the wife but not to the husband. It
thus reaffirmed the principle that gender is "no longer a permissible
factor in the determination of. . .legal rights." 39 The purpose of the
amendment, as the court interpreted it, was to eliminate gender as a
basis for distinguishing between the legal rights of men and women.40
In Darrin v. Gould,41 the Washington Supreme Court appeared to
adopt the Pennsylvania approach. 42 Darrin involved a Washington
Interscholastic Activities Association regulation prohibiting females
from participating in contact sports with males. Relying heavily on a
Pennsylvania case,43 the court held the regulation unconstitutional
because it classified solely on the basis of gender, without regard to
the individual's abilities. 44 Darrin marked the Washington court's first
attempt at determining the appropriate standard of review under the
ERA.45 Marchioro represented the court's first opportunity to refine
the Darrin standard.
36. 318 A.2d at 326.
37. Id.
38. 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
39. 327 A.2d at 62.
40. Id. The court expounded, "The law will not impose different benefits or differ-
ent burdens upon the members of a society based on the fact that they may be man or
woman." Id.
41. 85 Wn. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
42. The Marchioro dissent interpreted Darrin as having adopted "a standard for ap-
plication of the new constitutional amendment, namely, outright prohibition of classifi-
cations on the basis of sex, even where such a classification would have been permissible
under the equal protection clause. All classifications based on sex are prohibited." 90
Wn. 2d at 316, 582 P.2d at 487 (emphasis in original).
43. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. 645, 334
A.2d 839 (1975) (striking down a similar provision as violative of the Pennsylvania
ERA), discussed in Darrin, 85 Wn. 2d at 872-74, 540 P.2d at 890-91. The Darrin court
quoted lengthy portions of, and relied on, the rationale of the Pennsylvania court. The
court even cited with approval the general rule in Pennsylvania that "'. sex may no
longer be accepted as an exclusive classifying tool .... 85 Wn. 2d at 872, 540 P.2d at
891 (quoting Pennsylvania Interscholastic Ass'n, 334 A.2d at 843).
44. Id. at 875, 540 P.2d at 891.
45. Earlier decisions mentioned the ERA but did not turn on its interpretation. See,
e.g., Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 509 (1974); Singer v. Hara, I I Wn. App.
247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
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II. THE MARCHIORO COURT'S REASONING
The Marchioro court rejected the argument that under Darrin gen-
der-based classifications were forbidden. It viewed Darrin as rejecting
the "strict scrutiny/equal protection" approach, 46 but not prohibiting
all gender-based classifications. 47 The equal protection analysis was
replaced with a single inquiry: "Is the classification by sex discrimina-
tory?" 48 The court saw the adoption of the ERA by referendum as re-
quiring more than "'repeat [ing] what was already contained in the
otherwise governing constitutional provisions, federal and state, by
which discrimination based on sex was permissible under the rational
relationship and strict scrutiny tests.' 49 The amendment prohibited
discrimination, not classification, on the basis of sex. 50
46. See note 49 and accompanying text infra. The Marchioro court overlooked the
primary principle of Darrin, that classification cannot be based solely on gender, absent
a relation to the individual's ability to perform the activity regulated.
47. 90 Wn. 2d at 305, 582 P.2d at 491. The tone of the decision implies that the
court viewed the new standard as falling somewhere between strict scrutiny and an ab-
solute prohibition of gender-based classifications. In the Marchioro court's view, strict
scrutiny did not go far enough in implementing the ERA, while the absolute standard
advocated by the plaintiffs went too far.
48. As the court put it more fully:
Under the equal rights amendment the [strict scrutiny] test is replaced by the
single criterion: Is the classification by sex discriminatory? or, in the language of
the amendment, Has equality been denied or abridged on account of sex? In the
language of Darrin v. Gould at page 877, "under our ERA discrimination on ac-
count of sex is forbidden."
Id. at 305, 582 P.2d at 491 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 304, 582 P.2d at 491 (quoting from Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 871,
540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975)). The court continued as follows:
"Any other view would mean the people intended to accomplish no change in the ex-
isting constitutional law governing sex discrimination, except possibly to make the
validity of a classification based on sex come within the suspect class under Const.
art. 1, sec. 12 .... Had such a limited purpose been intended, there would have
been no necessity to resort to the broad, sweeping, mandatory language of the
Equal Rights Amendment."
Id. at 304-05, 582 P.2d at 491 (quoting Darrin, 85 Wn. 2d at 871, 540 P.2d at 889).
The Official Voters Pamphlet for the 1972 elections in discussing the proposed Wash-
ington ERA described pre-ERA law in much the same way as did the Marchioro and
Darrin courts: "[T] he present federal and state constitutions contain general prohibi-
tions ... against governmental actions which discriminate among persons or classes of
persons without a reasonable basis." Voters Pamphlet, supra note 32, at 53. But the
court's argument that by adopting the ERA the people intended that the standard of re-
view go beyond strict scrutiny is not necessarily sound. The people could merely have
been affirming and permanently affixing the court's treatment of sex discrimination.
But see notes 77-78 and accompanying text infra.
50. 90 Wn. 2d at 304-05, 582 P.2d at 491-92, discussed in notes 64-66 and ac-
companying text infra.
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The court explicitly rejected both the strict scrutiny and absolute
standards of review. 5' The court saw the basic thrust of the ERA as
ending "special treatment for or discrimination against either sex." 52
But fulfillment of these purposes did not necessarily require invalida-
tion of R.C.W. §§ 29.42.020-.030. The legislature remained free un-
der the ERA to take affirmative steps to ensure the actual as well as
theoretical equality of women. 53 The statutes were viewed as creating
equality of right to hold office.5 4 The legislature's attempt to affirma-
tively promote equality through passage of R.C.W. §§ 29.42.020-
.030 justified the gender-based classifications of the statutes.55 The
legislative determination that there should be absolute equality in the
hierarchy of the major political parties did not amount to discrimina-
tion because it prevented either sex from predominating. The court
was unable to find any authority that statute-mandated equality vio-
lated the ERA. Because equality under the statute does not violate the
ERA, the court reasoned that the state may adopt rational means,
here requiring the election of one man and one woman from each
county, to achieve the equality required.56
Washington's ERA is unique in explicitly requiring equality of both
rights and responsibilities. 57 R.C.W. §§ 29.42.020-.030 were found
to implement the requirement of equal responsibility by insuring that
both sexes participate in political party policymaking. 58 The court
51. The court disposes of both standards in one paragraph:
In memoranda to the trial court and briefs to this court, plaintiffs assert the
equal rights amendment forbids any classification based on sex. They cite Darrin
... in support of this view. This is not, however, what Darrin said. The determina-
tion that classification by sex is suspect, which is the key to the analysis used under
equal protection . . . has been replaced by the new demands of the equal rights
amendment.
90 Wn. 2d at 304, 582 P.2d at 491.
52. Id. at 305, 582 P.2d at 491.
53. The court supported this assertion as follows: "'[Passage of the ERA] does not
mean, however .... that the government would be powerless to take measures to assure
women actual as well as theoretical equality of rights."' 90 Wn. 2d at 306, 582 P.2d at
491 (quoting Emerson, supra note 29, at 904). The court appears to have quoted this
statement slightly out of context, especially in light of the article's assertion that benign
quotas would be impermissible under the ERA. See note 75 infra.
54. The effect of these statutes was to require, in the court's opinion, "[t] he state
committee of each major political party [to] be composed of an equal number of men
and women." 90 Wn. 2d at 306, 542 P.2d at 492. In the court's opinion this was clearly
not an abridgement or denial of equality of rights under the law. Id.
55. Id. at 306-08, 582 P.2d at 492-93.
56. Id. at 306-07, 582 P.2d at 492.
57. Id. at 307-08, 582 P.2d at 492-93.
58. Id. at 306, 308, 582 P.2d at 491, 493. But see text accompanying notes 70-71
infra.
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concluded that striking down the statute for violating the very consti-
tutional provision it sought to implement would be illogical.5 9
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
The court in Marchioro abandoned the definitive standard of re-
view adopted in Darrin for a more vague, general prohibition of gen-
der-based discrimination. This represents a departure from principled
decisionmaking-a departure without basis. Alternative standards of
review were rejected without analysis or discussion. Finally, the
standard adopted does not carry out the mandate or purposes of the
ERA.
A. The Standard of Review After Marchioro
The purpose of the ERA was to prevent gender-based discrimina-
tion.60 The Washington court, rather than developing a practical stan-
dard of review which implements this goal, has offered no clearer test
than whether the challenged statute discriminates on the basis of gen-
der.61 In effect, the court's standard of review under the ERA can be
characterized as one of "no discrimination." The court does not
define "discrimination," nor does it clarify the amount or type of dis-
parity in the treatment of the sexes it would tolerate. 62 The only clue
as to what constitutes discrimination is the court's holding that a stat-
ute which mandates absolute equality of numbers between sexes does
not. Close analysis of the holding in Marchioro reveals, however, that
the court may be applying the strict scrutiny standard sub silentio,
while purporting to reject it.63
The court's test focuses on whether the classification discriminates,
and therefore is impermissible, or does not discriminate, and therefore
59. 90 Wn. 2d at 308, 582 P.2d at 493.
60. Id. at 304, 582 P.2d at 491.
61. In short, the court has defined the standard of review under the ERA as the
ERA.
62. Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973), which involved a woman's
right to unemployment compensation during pregnancy, may provide some insight into
what constitutes "discrimination." There the court said the question whether a classifica-
tion whether the classification is in fact discriminating. Rather, in holding that the classi-
fication was discriminatory, the court looked to the fact that the statute's requirement
applied to only one gender, and that it placed a heavier burden on women than on men.
63. 90 Wn. 2d at 304, 582 P.2d at 491 (rejection of strict scrutiny standard).
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is permissible. Thus, gender-based classifications may be upheld un-
der the ERA, so long as the classification has a legally supportable
basis64 in achieving the ends of a statute. 65 In other words, the court is
labeling as "no discrimination" legally permissible discrimination.
Likewise, equal protection analysis determines whether a challenged
classification has a legally supportable basis in achieving the ends of a
statute.66 In Marchioro the court held that the one man/one woman
requirements of R.C.W. §§ 29.42.020-.030 do not discriminate be-
cause they result in absolute equality of numbers and rights.67 One
plausible explanation and the one suggested by the court's language is
that the attempt to affirmatively promote equality justifies the sex
classification. 68 This result is consistent with equal protection analy-
sis; the court, in essence, upholds the statute because the classification
promotes a compelling state interest-the actual as well as theoretical
equality of women. 69
The result under this standard, as pointed out by Justice Horowitz
in his dissent, is undesirable. Justice Dolliver's majority opinion
equates equality of numbers with equality of rights, an interpretation
64. Marchioro gives no guidelines in determining first, what the strength of the
connection between the statute's purpose and the classification must be, and second, if
the court's decision will turn on the purpose of the statute.
65. In Marchioro the end of the statutes appears to be to ensure an equal voice for
women in the political process. See note 68 infra.
66. Under equal protection analysis, if the classification is "suspect," "a State must
show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and
that its use of the classification is 'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or
the safeguarding of its interest." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (footnotes
omitted).
67. 90Wn. 2d at 306, 582 P.2d at 491.
68. See 90 Wn. 2d at 306-08, 582 P.2d at 492-93. The closing comment of the
court is indicative of its view that promoting equality of numbers effectuates rather than
violates the ERA. "When the state, by statute, mandates an equality of responsibility, it
is hardly appropriate for this court to hold this statutory mandate to be stricken by the
very constitutional provisions which approve it." 90 Wn. 2d at 308, 582 P.2d at 493.
Justice Horowitz in dissent describes this reasoning as "error," noting:
The sex-related provisions of the statutes have the effect that once a woman is cho-
sen to represent her county on the state committee ... no other woman is eligible
... even though she may be the best qualified candidate and the person who would
receive the most votes in a free election .... All women desiring to seek and hold
the remaining office are denied the right to do so merely because of their sex. Obvi-
ously, the same inequity applies to men seeking office under these statutes. ...
Clearly the majority opinion prevents the Equal Rights Amendment from achiev-
ing its purpose of making sex a neutral factor, one to be disregarded in favor of
ability and performance.
Id. at 317, 582 P.2d at 497 (emphasis in original).
69. See note 66 supra.
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"obviously at odds with both the language and the spirit of the
amendment. '70 Equality of right to seek and hold office is not guaran-
teed when those offices are allocated on the basis of gender in order to
achieve equality of numbers. Once one of the "paired" offices is filled,
all other persons of the same gender are denied the right to hold the
other office, solely on the basis of their gender, regardless of their re-
spective abilities.71 Justice Horowitz reasoned, "Here the activity reg-
ulated is representation of a constituency on the Democratic Party's
county or state committees. It should be obvious that sex is com-
pletely unrelated to the ability of an individual to perform these du-
ties. This classfication based on sex is ...prohibited by the equal
rights amendment. '72
The statutes are, in effect, a quota, reserving fifty percent of the
seats on the Democratic State Committee for each gender.7 3 The
court's decision suggests that it viewed R.C.W. §§ 29.42.020-.030 as
means of effectuating the ERA.74 Such quotas, however, appear to vi-
olate the absolute nature of the amendment.75
70. 90 Wn. 2d at 316, 582 P.2d at 497 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
71. Id.at316-17,582P.2dat497.
72. Id.
73. The court suggests that under this absolute equality, "[n] either sex may pre-
dominate," and "[n] either may discriminate or be discriminated against." 90 Wn. 2d at
306, 582 P.2d at 492. This suggests that if the division of positions had not been exactly
equal the legislation would not have been upheld. Thus, if laws were enacted requiring
apportionment on the basis of gender, a percentage other than 50-50 would violate the
ERA.
74. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
Using sex as the basis of a quota may violate the equal protection clause of the federal
Constitution. In a recent case dealing with affirmative action, the United States Su-
preme Court held that although race may be considered in passing on medical school ap-
plications, a special admissions program assuring minority students a specified
percentage of the available spots solely on the basis of race was invalid. Regents of
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell, delivering the
Court's judgment that the admissions plan was unlawful, reasoned that preferring cer-
tain persons solely because of their race or ethnic origin was "discrimination for its own
sake. This the Constitution prohibits." Id. at 307. Bakke is not directly on point because
it deals with racial discrimination under the equal protection clause. Nor does Justice
Powell's reasoning represent the opinion of a majority of the Court. One may analogize,
however, from the general premise that it is unlawful to save a specified percentage of
available seats for one class of persons on the basis of an impermissible classification,
that the Marchioro court is doing what the Bakke Court rejected.
75. The legislative history of the federal ERA points out that the ERA "does not re-
quire that any level of government establish quotas for men or for women in any of its
activities; rather, it simply prohibits discrimination on the basis of a person's sex." SEN-
ATE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 29, at 11. Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freed-
man discuss the use of benign quotas at some length in their article. They note:
In the field of race relations various methods for taking affirmative action to se-
cure actual, as well as theoretical, equality have been employed. One is the benign
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The ERA constitutes an independent basis for challenging a stat-
ute, namely, denial or abridgement of rights and responsibilities under
the law on account of sex. Thus courts interpreting ERA's are not
bound by standards used in other contexts and may develop new stan-
dards or apply analogous ones. The Marchioro court summarily con-
sidered and rejected both the strict scrutiny and absolute standards of
review described above.
In rejecting strict scrutiny, the court relied on Darrin's statement
that the people's adoption of the ERA mandated more than continued
application of the strict scrutiny standard.76 Adoption of the ERA,
however, was more than a rejection of strict scrutiny. The Voters
Pamphlet suggests that the passage of the proposed ERA would pro-
hibit all gender-based classifications: "This proposed amendment
would add to the Washington State Constitution the principle that sex
is not a permissible factor to be considered in determining the legal
rights of women or of men."' 77 Thus, the intent of the voters, to the ex-
tent it can be inferred from the language of the Voters Pamphlet, was
to adopt an absolute standard prohibiting all classifications based on
gender.7 8
quota.... Other kinds of affirmative action consist of some form of compensatory
aid. This involves special assistance to members of one race ....
The Supreme Court has not passed on the constitutional issues raised by these
devices. It is not improbable, however, that in the field of race relations they will be
sustained. In equal protection theory, while classification by race would be "sus-
pect," it is not totally prohibited. And where the courts determine the purpose of
the differentiation is to benefit members of the minority race, rather than impose a
status of inferiority, they are likely to find there are "compelling reasons" for the
special treatment. Such an approach would not be permissible under the Equal
Rights Amendment .... [T] he guarantee of equal rights for women may not be
qualified in the manner that "suspect classification" or "fundamental interest" doc-
trines allow.
Emerson, supra note 29, at 903-04 (footnotes omitted).
76. 90 Wn. 2d at 304-05, 582 P.2d at 491, quoted in note 49 and accompanying
text supra.
77. Voters Pamphlet, supra note 32, at 53 (emphasis added). Also, in discussing the
nineteenth amendment, the Voters Pamphlet describes it as the only present prohibition
of "legal classification of persons solely on the basis of sex." Id. This also suggests the
amendment prohibits classification based solely on sex, in other words, the absolute
standard of review.
78. Pre-ERA law was explained as follows:
Both the present federal and state constitution contain general prohibitions
(commonly referred to as "equal protection" clauses) against governmental actions
which discriminate among persons or classes of persons without a reasonable basis.
It is presently permissible under these provisions, in some instances, to base legal
classifications of persons solely upon sex .... The only area in which there is now
an explicit constitutional prohibition against the legal classification of persons
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In order to carry out effectively both the purpose and mandate of
the ERA it is necessary to adopt an absolute standard of review under
the ERA.79 The language of the Voters Pamphlet,80 the legislative his-
tory of the almost identical federal ERA,81 and the contentions of the
ERA's proponents,82 all support the absolute prohibition of gender-
based classifications. Gender should not be a factor in determining le-
gal rights.
B. A Suggested Analysis
The court, in reviewing a statute challenged under the ERA, should
make both of the following determinations:
1. Does the statute classify on the basis of gender?
Essential to any analysis under the ERA is the determination that
the challenged statute contains a gender-based classification. Until
solely on the basis of sex is that of voting, under the 19th Amendment to the United
States Constitution ....
Voters Pamphlet, supra note 32, at 53 (emphasis added). The Darrin court based its de-
cision in part on the intent of the voters in adopting the ERA. Darrin, 85 Wn. 2d at 871,
540 P.2d at 889.
It is settled that the court may rely on the language of the Voters Pamphlet in deter-
mining the purposes and meaning of enacted legislation in Washington. The Washing-
ton court has stated, "In determining the meaning of legislation enacted through initia-
tive or referendum, the courts have the right to look to, and may consider, the published
arguments made in connection with the submission of such measures to the vote of the
electorate." Lynch v. Department of Labor & Indus., 19 Wn. 2d 802, 812, 145 P.2d 265,
270 (1944). "In determining the purpose and import of initiative measures we may
consider '... the common understanding of the purpose of the law, according to argu-
ments supporting that view submitted to the people for their support at the general elec-
tion.'" State ex. rel. Public Util. Dist. No. I v. Wylie, 28 Wn. 2d 113, 127, 182 P.2d
706, 714 (1974) (quoting from Denny v. Wooster, 175 Wash. 272, 27 P.2d 328 (1933)).
79. The leading article by Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman takes the follow-
ing position:
The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissi-
ble factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men. This means that the
treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance that
such person is of one sex or the other .... [T] he fact that in our present society
members of one sex are more likely to be found in a particular activity or to per-
form a particular function does not allow the law to fix legal rights by virtue of
membership in that sex. In short, sex is a prohibited classification.
Emerson, supra note 29, at 889. Note that the same wording appears in the Voters Pam-
phlet statement and in the article quoted above regarding the effect of the adoption of
the ERA: "sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women or of
men." Voters Pamphlet, supra note 32, at 53.
80. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
82. See Emerson, supra note 29, at 889, quoted in note 79 supra.
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that determination is made the ERA would appear to have no applica-
tion. 83 There are three ways in which a statute can classify on the
basis of gender. First, the statute can impose a burden or grant a
privilege to one gender which it denies to the other.84 Second, the stat-
ute can use a facially neutral classification that, in practical applica-
tion, has a discriminatory impact.85 Such a classification would seri-
ously undermine the purposes of the ERA. Therefore, the court must
look beyond the "neutral" classification to the realities of its
application. 86 Third, a statute can expressly classify on the basis of
gender. 87
2. Does the classification depend solely on gender, without any
relation to the individual's ability to perform the activity regulated?
Gender is often used by the legislature as a shorthand for other
classifications it really wants to regulate but which are much more dif-
ficult to administer.88 This inquiry forces the legislature to fashion
statutory classifications which are more congruent with the activity
regulated. 89
Application of this standard, while not problem free, 90 would result
83. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn. App. 247, 258-59, 522 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1974). Singer
involved a statute forbidding marriage between persons of the same sex. No gender-
based classification was found, because the statute forbade both men and women from
marrying persons of the same sex. The Marchioro court cited Singer with approval. See
Marchioro, 90 Wn. 2d at 305, 307, 582 P.2d 582 P.2d at 491, 492 (1978). For a criticism
of the court's analysis in Singer, see 10 GONZ. L. REv. 292 (1974).
84. Cf., e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (holding that re-
quiring female employees to make larger contributions to its pension fund than male
employees is unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (holding that denying a woman
her accumulated seniority when returning from pregnancy leave is unlawful sex dis-
crimination).
85. Cf., e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that minimum
height and weight requirements, which by national statistics excluded more women than
men from prison work, were unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
86. It is important to guard against the use of non-gender-based classifications
which, in effect, fall more heavily on one sex than the other and circumvent the ERA.
For this reason an examination of a statute challenged under the ERA should include a
determination that the law is gender-neutral in effect. Emerson, supra note 29, at 898-
99.
87. Marchioro meets this test. See note 92 and accompanying text infra.
88. Emerson, supra note 29, at 897.
89. The concern here is to make sure that the previously discussed three exceptions
to the absolute standard of review are properly applied and not used to circumvent the
ERA's purpose. See notes 31- 33 and accompanying text supra.
90. For some insight into the problems involved, see Emerson, supra note 29, at
889- 909.
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in an interpretation of the Washington ERA consistent with its pur-
pose and history.91
Clearly, under this suggested standard of review, R.C.W. §§ 29.-
42.020-.030 would have been struck down as violating the ERA.
First, the statutes contain the most obvious kind of gender-based clas-
sifications, requiring "one committeeman and one committeewoman
for each county" and a "chairman and vice chairman who must be of
opposite sexes." 92 Second, the classifications are based solely on gen-
der, without any relation to the individual's ability to represent the
county on the Democratic State Central Committee. 93
IV. CONCLUSION
While the vague "no discrimination" standard adopted by the Mar-
chioro court may provide it with more flexibility to develop an appro-
priate standard of review, it also leaves the law unclear and provides
inadequate guidance for future decisions. This is particularly true if
the court is applying strict scrutiny sub silentio.
Because the ERA provides a new constitutional basis for challeng-
ing legislation the court must develop a method of resolving such
challenges, including a standard of review which reflects the purposes
and mandate of the ERA. This can best be accomplished by adopting
an absolute standard of review under the Washington Equal Rights
Amendment.
Irene Hecht
91. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra (discussion of history and pur-
pose of Washington ERA).
92. Marchioro falls within the third category mentioned in the text: it expressly
classifies on the basis of gender. Once one position is filled by a woman, all other
women are automatically excluded solely on the basis of their gender.
93. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
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